WebEyster and Rabin ( 2005 ), experiments conducted more recently have found additional support for the concept of cursed equilibrium in different contexts. Crawford and Iriberri (2007 ) use data from several different auction experiments to estimate models that allow for heterogeneity in the cursedness parameter. They estimate that almost half of ... Web1In this paper we define and study a weaker form of “cursedness” that is in the spirit of Eyster and Rabin’s (2005) “cursed equilibrium” and similar to the “coarse analogy partition” variant of Jehiel’s (2005) “analogy-based expecations equilibrium” as applied to Bayesian games by Jehiel and Koessler (2008). 2
Hypothetical Thinking and Information Extraction in the …
Webstrategic situations, Eyster and Rabin (2005) define cursed equilibrium in Bayesian games by the requirement that every player correctly predicts the behavior of others, but fails to … WebSep 27, 2024 · Eyster and Rabin and Murooka and Yamashita consider a situation where the buyer may be “cursed” in that he under-appreciates the correlation between the … trigonumresektion nach gosheger
Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner’s Curse?: …
WebOct 8, 2024 · Erik Eyster is at the London School of Economics. Matthew Rabin is at Harvard University. Dimitri Vayanos is at the London School of Economics, CEPR, and NBER. We thank Nick Barberis; Bruno Biais (the Editor); John Campbell; Kent Daniel; Willie Fuchs; Xavier Gabaix; Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch; Josh Schwartzstein; Andrei Shleifer; … WebIn response to Eyster and Rabin (2005) and Crawford and Iriberri (2007), we in-vestigate experimentally whether the WC in common-value auctions is indeed driven by beliefs.3 We use a second-price common-value auction, called the maximal game, which has the special property of being two-step dominance-solvable. Our experi- WebUnited Kingdom (e-mail: [email protected]); Rabin: Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 549 Evans Hall, #3880 Berkeley, CA 94720-3880 (e-mail: … terry from love island